

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

COMBATING TERRORISM WITH PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

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## ABSTRACT

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Preparation of the battlespace is military concept that directly contributes to successful contingency operations. An integrated approach to the full range of military activities during peacetime and pre-crisis deployments is essential for mission success and can reduce the risks to U.S. forces during contingencies. Its increasing importance is underscored by the 2002 National Security Strategy, which places clear emphasis on pre-emptive measures against threats to U.S. national security.

This paper discusses the preparation of the battlespace concept, its utility to successful operations, and the challenges and risks associated with its execution. Its two major components are intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB), and operational preparation of the battlespace (OPB). OPB consists of the full range of peacetime and pre-crisis activities in a potential operational area to include: engagement and training activities, pre-crisis surveys and assessments, and advance force operations (AFO).

There are several challenges to approving and implementing preparation of the battlespace operations to fight terrorism. First, a family of campaign plans is required to focus interagency and military efforts on fighting terrorism. Second, the PB concept needs to be understood and used. Finally, related core processes need to be developed and refined to effectively defeat terrorism.



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## PREFACE

Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing. It includes neglect of responsibility so poorly defined or so ambiguously delegated that action gets lost. It includes gaps in intelligence, but also intelligence that, like a string of pearls too precious to wear, is too sensitive to give those who need it. It includes the alarm that fails to work, but also the alarm that has gone off so often it has been disconnected. It includes the unalert watchman, but also the one who knows he'll be chewed out by his superior if he gets higher authority out of bed. It includes the contingencies that occur to no one, but also those that everyone assumes somebody else is taking care of. It includes straightforward procrastination, but also decisions protracted by internal disagreement. It includes, in addition, the inability of individual human beings to rise to the occasion until they are sure of the occasion—which is usually too late. (Unlike movies, real life provides no musical background to tip us off to the climax.) Finally, as at Pearl Harbor, surprise may include some measure of genuine novelty introduced by the enemy, and possibly some sheer bad luck.

The results, at Pearl Harbor, were sudden, concentrated, and dramatic. The failure, however, was cumulative, widespread, and rather drearily familiar. This is why surprise, when it happens to a government, cannot be described just in terms of startled people. Whether at Pearl Harbor or at the Berlin Wall, surprise is everything involved in a government's (or alliance's) failure to anticipate effectively.

— Thomas C. Shelling

— *Forward to Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision*

I found this sadly appropriate quotation while conducting research for this project. More profoundly, it was the preface to both a book about the failings of intelligence warnings and decision makers that preceded the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor, and a report to Congress about the state of America's defenses against terrorism. This report to the 105th Congress, written by the National Commission on Terrorism and dated 13 July 2000, now reads as a blueprint for the recriminations against the U.S. government that followed the events of September the 11th, 2001. This report states, in part:

**International terrorism poses an increasingly dangerous and difficult threat to America.** [original emphasis] ...Today's terrorists seek to inflict mass casualties, and they are attempting to do so both overseas and on American soil. They are less dependent on state sponsorship and are, instead, forming loose, transnational affiliations based on religious or ideological affinity and a common hatred of the United States. This makes terrorist attacks more difficult to detect and prevent.

— Report of National Commission on Terrorism to 105<sup>th</sup> Congress  
13 July 2000, p. 2

This characterization of the terrorist threat in 2000 reads very much like our post-9/11 understanding of Al Queda and its affiliates. If we knew who they were and could accurately describe them, why didn't we do something about it beforehand? The answer to this question is the subject of speculation; the question will be formally examined in the months and years to



come both inside and outside the U.S. government. But there will not be a single answer. Rather, it will be a complex array of answers. One potential response to the question could be: We didn't have the ability to go after the terrorists without starting a war. In other words, the strategic and operational means and ways did not support what needed to be done to effectively counter the growing Al Qaeda threat.

We...all of us in the military and the government...have been entrusted with the defense of our nation, our ideals, and our fellow citizens. We simply have to do a better job of carrying out this mission, which is more aptly described as a sacred contract between our citizens and the national security establishment. Old ways and means may not be appropriate in order to be effective against global terrorism.

And that is what this paper is about—a new way of doing business. Preparation of the battlespace is a concept that has been discussed and tinkered with inside the Special Operations Forces (SOF) community for some time, and needs to be articulated then used by the larger defense community. The concept is simple: identify where the terrorists are operating, then develop the enablers to interdict them before they can strike Americans.

Many thanks are due to Mr. Dave Eichenberger of the Special Actions Division, U.S. Special Operations Command. Dave provided the initial operating concept for “preparation of the battlespace” and has been formalizing this concept in conjunction with the Joint Staff and Combatant Commander staffs. He provided the base documentation for this research effort. Additionally, he has provided extensive advice and comment on the subject and paper itself.

Additional help has been provided by Mr. Mark Dunham, who works in the Special Operations Directorate of the J-3, Joint Staff. Other members of the SOD provided information to support this research as well. Additional thoughts and comments were provided by LTC Tom Johnson, who works in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict.

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## COMBATING TERRORISM WITH PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

“Deterrence...means nothing against shadowy terrorist networks with no nation or citizens to defend. Containment is not possible when unbalanced dictators with weapons of mass destruction can deliver those weapons on missiles or secretly provide them to terrorist allies. If we wait for threats to fully materialize, we will have waited too long. Yet the war on terror will not be won on the defensive. We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans, and confront the worst threats before they emerge. In the world we have entered, the only path to safety is the path of action. And this nation will act.

Different circumstances require different methods...

— President George W. Bush<sup>1</sup>

### WHAT ARE WE DOING TO FIGHT GLOBAL TERRORISM?

Swift and decisive military operations that followed the traumatic events of 11 September 2001 toppled Afghanistan’s governing but illegitimate regime. Those actions also dealt a serious blow to the Al Qaeda terrorist cells, infrastructure, and bases in that country, and exposed its operatives across the globe. However, the successes in Southwest Asia do not overshadow two glaring facts. First, a nonstate actor directly and unexpectedly attacked the U.S. by asymmetric means with devastating effects. Second, the U.S. national security structure received a wake-up call: previous ways and means used to protect America were no longer adequate against this type of threat. Both facts point to the inescapable conclusion that “something” has to change drastically to prevent a repetition of similar acts in the future. We must defeat determined and resourceful terrorists before they attack.

President Bush clearly stated we are at war against terrorists and must aggressively act to defeat them. Is the U.S. military effectively and efficiently using every opportunity to prepare for contingency operations as part of the war on terrorism? Arguably, the answer is “no.” Are there better ways and means to fight terrorism and shape the global security environment? The short answer is “yes”; we can and must do better to defeat terrorism as the first challenge to our national security in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century. How can we improve our approach to defeating global terrorism? What follows is an examination of these questions and how the U.S. can improve some key aspects of how we prepare for and fight global terrorism.

The ongoing war on terrorism has profoundly affected the U.S.’ strategic and operational environments, and dramatically changed the ways in which we prepare for and conduct warfare. This paper examines the critical role of “preparation of the battlespace” and explores how it can best be employed in the campaign against terrorism. It examines terrorism within the context of

the strategic environment, identifies and discusses preparation of the battlespace concepts, and proposes changes to better capitalize on existing capabilities to effectively prepare the battlespace to defeat terrorism.

The process of change and improvement has already begun. President Bush articulated his vision for protecting the homeland, aggressively defeating terrorists, and creating a more secure future for America in his June 2002 address to the graduating class of the United States Military Academy at West Point.<sup>2</sup> The “Bush Doctrine” was followed in September 2002 with a radically new National Security Strategy (NSS). The previous NSS, released in December 2000, addressed a global security environment quite different from the world that revealed itself in the early fall of 2001. The current NSS states, “...the enemy is terrorism [and] the war against terrorists with global reach is a global enterprise of uncertain duration.”<sup>3</sup> The two major military aspects of NSS '02 are strengthening alliances to defeat terrorism and preventing threats from weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A supporting concept is the stated willingness to conduct preemptive activities and operations to negate threats to U.S. security interests.

The current draft National Military Strategy (NMS) has changed as well. It moves beyond the previous NMS' “Shape, Prepare, Respond” construct to match the current and future realities of fighting a national campaign against terrorism: “The U.S. is currently engaged in a war on terrorism that is global in scope and that will require a sustained national effort over the long term.”<sup>4</sup> Included in the new NMS is a series of prescriptive measures that address how the Combatant Commanders will employ joint forces to “protect, prevent, and prevail” in support of the national military objectives of “...defend the U.S. homeland, promote security and deter aggression, win the Nation's wars, and ensure military superiority.”<sup>5</sup>

The 2002 National Security and National Military Strategies provide the essential guidance and framework for fighting terrorism on a global scale.<sup>6</sup> Further, The White House recently released the National Strategy to Combat Terrorism (February 2003).<sup>7</sup> While they constitute sufficient strategic guidance, a coordinated strategic campaign plan has yet to be developed. Despite this lack of a strategic campaign plan, a global military campaign plan to defeat terrorism has been developed but has not yet been implemented.<sup>8</sup> The global terrorist threat requires new concepts and procedures be employed over an indeterminate period to effectively defeat it. Supporting theater campaign plans must also be developed to defeat terrorism on a regional scale, with the Joint Staff coordinating operations across theater boundaries to synchronize the related campaigns on a global scale. The complexity of the effort is enormous.

The U.S. military conducts a broad range of activities within each theater during peacetime that could directly contribute to shaping effective contingency responses. However, these largely independent activities are not efficiently synchronized and integrated to shape and prepare the operational environment for future contingencies. One innovative and particularly relevant concept for shaping the operational and strategic environments prior to a crisis or contingency is “preparation of the battlespace” (PB). Additionally, PB can provide the context for integrating multiple theater activities into a more focused campaign to fight terrorism, improve the joint force’s understanding of the operational environment, and systematically gather information to support future contingency operations. Preparation of the battlespace can also broaden response options, facilitate direct support activities prior to the employment of forces, and enhance the effectiveness of committed joint forces.

This paper will discuss how terrorism has changed U.S national security, discuss how preparation of the battlespace can be used to fight terrorism and shape the operational environment, and conclude with recommendations to improve the strategic and operational approaches to the war on terrorism. Part I provides the background for understanding terrorism in the post-9/11 world and will discuss how the terrorist threat has changed the global operating environment. Part II will discuss PB as a new approach to preparing crisis response options and providing direct support to contingency operations. This portion will focus on the preparation of the battlespace operational concept and its components. Part III will discuss changes required to use preparation of the battlespace effectively to defeat terrorism and shape the operational environment.

## **BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF TERRORIST THREATS TO THE U.S.**

### **TERRORISM AS WE KNEW IT PRIOR TO 11 SEPTEMBER 2001**

Prior to 11 September 2001 terrorism was routinely classified into three typologies: they were either state-sponsored entities, radical ideological groups, or related to separatist movements. However, there is evidence that this general categorization of terrorist groups lagged behind reality: well-known and politically motivated groups were fading from the threat equation and international networks based on radical Islam coalesced into a significant threat against non-Islamic and secular states.

Nevertheless, state-sponsored terrorist groups remain. These are typified by Hezbollah, with its known connections to Iran, and Hamas with its links to Syria. Countries are still branded as “state sponsors of terrorism” when they provide safe havens, logistical, financial, and political

support. The international community sanctions the sponsoring states to varying degrees. States also support individual or small-scale operations, which are considered illegal acts for prosecution via law enforcement channels. The reasons for state sponsorship varies, and typically include political advancement of strategic ends, such as spread an ideology or to gain regional influence. One 1998 research study cited the typical view of this form of terrorism as "State-sponsored terrorism aims to achieve strategic ends in circumstances where the use of conventional armed forces is deemed inappropriate, ineffective, too risky, or too difficult."<sup>9</sup> Further, state sponsorship remains a cheap means for weaker states or groups to chip away at a more powerful opponent. In summary, "The high costs of modern warfare...and unwillingness to appear as the aggressor have turned terrorism into an efficient, convenient, and generally discrete weapon for attaining state interests in the international realm."<sup>10</sup>

Radical ideological terrorist groups provide another dimension to terrorism. They range from extreme right- and left-wing political groups, anarchists, and religiously motivated factions. European countries are a hotbed of radical leftists, and these groups seek to conduct high-impact operations to give publicity to their cause. Right-wing entities in the U.S., such as anti-abortion or paramilitary militias, are not a particular threat to American national security. Anarchists opposed to globalization attracted a myriad of radical allies for environmental, health, and economic causes, and present a similarly low-level threat to domestic and international security. Religion-based groups are particularly violent against those of other faiths, as characterized by the Islamic movements in the Middle East opposed to Israel and, by extension, the U.S. Again, these are generally localized threats on the regional level.<sup>11</sup>

Politically or ethnically-based separatist movements such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA), and Kurdish movements largely focused their violence towards local targets of political or military significance. These groups are mainly paramilitary movements that require the combined efforts of law enforcement and the military for suppression or elimination. Notwithstanding some continued activity, terrorism associated with these movements has somewhat subsided. Many have opted instead to reach political settlements instead of seeking their goals through violence.<sup>12</sup> The face of terrorism has changed.

The character of terrorism began to change beginning in the 1990s. State sponsorship declined with the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War. Ethnic and religious tensions were free to manifest themselves in open conflict, as seen in the Former Yugoslavia and Chechnya. Radical political and social ideologies waned due to political accommodation when

the issue-specific causes fell out of the public eye. Also, law enforcement succeeded in bringing terrorists to justice and suppressing the violence in some cases.

At the same time, the remaining terrorist groups elevated the level of violence through enhanced high explosive devices or employment of weapons of mass effects. The previous taboo against weapons of mass destruction was broken in the case of the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack in Tokyo. Correspondingly, the United States suffered an increasing number of devastating attacks around the world perpetrated by Islamic militants: the World Trade Center was bombed in 1993 by Islamic militants who used a vehicle-borne enhanced explosive device; the Khobar Towers barracks were bombed in Saudi Arabia by a large truck bomb in 1996; they used simultaneous truck bombs to destroy the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania in 1998; an explosives-laden boat seriously damaged the USS Cole in 2000 while in port at Aden, Yemen.<sup>13</sup> These events served as a harbinger to the terrorists' willingness and ability to ratchet up the destructiveness of their actions.

## THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY TERRORIST THREAT

Several changes in the nature of terrorism began to emerge during this period. First, the level of sophistication used by the terrorists dramatically increased. Larger and more complex bombs were constructed and effectively employed against large targets. This indicated increased use of advanced explosives techniques, reconnaissance, and target analysis. The Aum Shinrikyo sarin gas attack demonstrated that non-state actors could use advanced scientific methods to produce a weapon of mass destruction, and employ technical handling procedures to deliver it to the objective.

Second, terrorist groups steadily increased the level of violence in the 1990s, to include several instances of suicide attacks. The attacks progressed from small-scale events of local tactical importance to large devices with devastating results, often having strategic consequences. The actual lethal effects of the attacks seemed significantly out of proportion to the cause they purported to support. Few Americans were killed or wounded in the African embassy bombings compared to the numbers of innocent locals who had nothing to do with the American presence. As the world would later witness, the fact that large numbers of innocent people would be killed or wounded by an attack did not restrain terrorists bent on attacking U.S. interests.<sup>14</sup>

Third, non-state actors with non-state aspirations perpetrated the largest and most strategically debilitating terrorist attacks. The groups responsible for many of the attacks against Americans throughout the world were overwhelmingly radical Islamic movements



affiliated with Al Qaeda. These radical faith-based entities applied an equally radical logic in their calculations of means, ends, and proportionality. Most significantly, Islamic radical groups were not susceptible to the international community's traditional deterrence measures. Conventional political, economic and military responses are not effective against a non-state actor that owned no territory, was not a member of the U.N., and had no home address. U.S. and international laws treat these groups as criminal elements and have left law enforcement to contend with an increasingly violent and dangerous threat. Consequently, the U.S and the rest of the world were slow to realize that terrorism was becoming a major challenge to national security requiring significant military involvement.<sup>15</sup>

Fourth, Islamic terrorist groups began to form a loose coalition to oppose U.S., Israel, and secular nations. Osama bin Laden became enraged after the U.S. victory in DESERT STORM, and set out on a path to build on the success he and his supporters experienced in Afghanistan. In their view, the Islamic jihadists rid Afghanistan of the Soviets. Similarly, they now want the corrupt non-Muslims infidels out of the Middle East, and the U.S. out of Saudi Arabia in particular. Using Wahhabist ideology, bin Laden became a charismatic figure and depicted himself as "...the only person relatively effective at resisting the West in the name of Islam."<sup>16</sup> Further, "Bin Laden and his lieutenants...sold their followers on the idea that they are the only ones divinely chosen to rid the world of the 'Great Satan'."<sup>17</sup> The divine nature of this cause melded diverse ethnic groups with little in common into a larger radical Islamic movement. They now had common cause to cooperate on practical matters such as intelligence, operational techniques, and the provision of safe havens for operators. Radical Islamic movements have come to the fore in a general arc of unrest ranging from Algeria to Indonesia, posing a difficult international challenge for law enforcement and intelligence agencies.<sup>18</sup>

Fifth, intelligence "blind spots" developed where there was no government authority or legitimate legal presence, and resulted in terrorist groups finding safe havens. These gray areas presented an intelligence vacuum and made it nearly impossible for a single nation's intelligence or law enforcement services to find and preempt a terrorist group in its safe haven.<sup>19</sup> Component cells easily melted into lawless rural areas or the urban milieu. Security was (and is) bought from indigenous and like-minded ethnic groups living at the subsistence level. Abundant terrorist funding easily overmatched weak and underpaid government intelligence activities and civilian law enforcement. The urban environment also provided ready access to communications nets via messengers, the Internet, and commercial telecommunication systems.

Finally, the growing interconnectivity of global institutions and commerce has provided a borderless environment for terrorist to freely move money between institutions, communicate securely on the Internet, and simply hide in plain view. The Internet and satellite or cellular phones enable operational communication and relatively anonymous financial transactions. The Internet became the engine of international trade in the 1990s, but equally supports terrorist endeavors with its unimpeded and anonymous capability to move money and essential organizational information across international borders without the actual operatives exposing themselves to law enforcement or any other form of danger. The result is that terrorists have become increasingly capable of operating with impunity on a global scale.<sup>20</sup>

#### NATIONAL WILL: THEN AND NOW

This confluence of improved terrorist group internal security and effective evasion from law enforcement and a supporting global infrastructure significantly changed the terrorist's way of doing business. However, the U.S. did little to counter the changing and growing threat during the 1990s. Our nation remained vigilant, but in a defensive and primarily reactive mode. Counterterrorist forces consisted of intelligence agencies standing watch, law enforcement pursuing the criminal aspect of terrorist activities, and military forces standing ready to respond when called upon. One analyst described the prevailing pre-9/11 posture as "Counterterrorist forces [were] mostly pressed into the pattern of reaction. Specially trained units [used] force to save bystanders and hostages and to eliminate terrorists."<sup>21</sup> Quite simply, the terrorists had to engage in a hostile act for counterterrorist forces to be involved rather than preventing the event from occurring. Counterterrorism was seen as being sufficiently managed by the Department of Justice, given that there was only one major attack on U.S. soil (the first World Trade Center attack) with little actual loss of life. The attacks against U.S. diplomatic facilities and military forces overseas were troublesome, but perhaps viewed as risks inherent to a global presence.<sup>22</sup>

Similarly, the only visible U.S. response to the terrorist attacks during the 1990s and into the new millennium was a largely ineffective cruise missile attack on Al Qaeda camps in Afghanistan. The Islamic movements in general, and Al Qaeda in particular, viewed the U.S. as either politically unwilling or militarily unable to undertake effective counterterrorist measures. In the current context, "...the fact that the world's only superpower appears impotent in trying to find and capture [Islamic terrorists] only reinforces this perception that they are anointed by God."<sup>23</sup> In effect, we reinforced their beliefs of invulnerability and encouraged their continued support within the Islamic community.

Such was the new national security environment that emerged on 11 September 2001. Shortly after the U.S. resolved to respond to the attacks, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated, “The only way to deal with a terrorist network that’s global is to go after it where it is. The only alternative choice is to sit there and think you’re going to take the blows, and...that would be foolhardy and dangerous and self-defeating.”<sup>24</sup> Combating terrorism became a national priority and operational imperative for the Department of Defense and the rest of the U.S. Government. Contrary to the radical Islamists’ expectations, the U.S. clearly stated we would punish those responsible for 9/11 and destroy those that threaten American security interests. As one British commentator observed, “The September 11 attacks gave the Pentagon the moral authority to risk American casualties.”<sup>25</sup>

## **PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE**

### **A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

Adequate intelligence is the essential element for success in either a single counterterrorist operation or for a global campaign against terrorism. Preparation of the battlespace (PB) seeks to: reduce the difference between what is known and unknown before the crisis arises; provide actionable intelligence in real-time to the decision makers and planners; and support executing forces before and during contingency operations. PB, as a concept with theater-specific applications, is an integrated approach to the full range of military activities during peacetime deployments, pre-crisis activities, and contingency operations that can enhance planning and focus response options. The primary objective of PB operations is to support mission success and reduce the risks to deploying and committed forces. PB is useful to Combatant Commanders as a way to preclude crises and create favorable conditions for the conduct of crisis response operations within their theaters. The preparation of the battlespace concept and its components effectively employ theater-shaping activities.

As a precursor to understanding PB and for the purposes of this paper, “battlespace” is defined as found in Joint Pub 1-02:

The environment, factors, and conditions which must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes air, land, sea, space and the included enemy and friendly forces, facilities, weather, terrain, the electromagnetic spectrum,<sup>26</sup> and information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest.

Further, it is important to understand that “battlespace” refers to both the geographic and non-geographic dimensions of the operational area. The geographic aspects are the physical characteristics of the region or area, and are what we commonly see on a map or in an atlas such as the topography, demographics, or language distribution. The non-geographic aspects of the battlespace are the non-physical dimensions of the region such as public opinion, key personalities, or the political decision-making processes.

Conceptually, preparation of the battlespace consists of the full spectrum of theater and strategic activities conducted prior to D-Day, H-Hour to prepare for a potential crisis or contingency. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) defines “preparation of the battlespace” as “The umbrella term for all activities conducted prior to D-Day, H-Hour to plan and prepare for potential follow-on military operations.”<sup>27</sup> Its two major components are intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and operational preparation of the battlespace (OPB). IPB is an existing military concept used at the strategic to tactical levels, and is well known to military planners. It consists of the full range of intelligence functions and analytical activities, and aims to produce actionable intelligence for executing forces. IPB, as it applies to the preparation of the battlespace concept, focuses on intelligence collection, analysis, and special activities. IPB is a continual process, transcends the full range of military operations, and is generally the same process at all levels of war.<sup>28</sup>

The term OPB is seldom used outside of Special Operations Forces channels. OPB is defined by USSOCOM as “Non-intelligence activities conducted prior to D-Day, H-Hour, in likely or potential areas of employment, to train and prepare for follow-on military operations.”<sup>29</sup> OPB consists of both pre-crisis activities (PCA) and, when authorized, advance force operations (AFO). PCA are the full range of training activities conducted in a foreign country or region during peacetime and prior to a crisis that help shape the security environment and prepare for future operations in that country or region.<sup>30</sup> USSOCOM defines AFO as “Military operations conducted by forces which precede the main elements into the area of operations to prepare for follow-on operations.”<sup>31</sup> AFO may consist of, but are not limited to, reconnaissance and surveillance; joint reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces (JRSOI); information operations; terminal guidance; and other limited direct action operations. Further, OPB complements intelligence operations, such as IPB, with preparing of the battlespace.<sup>32</sup>

There are two major categories of preparation of the battlespace activities. The first category is intelligence-related operations conducted under the authorities of Title 50 U.S. Code. The second category is operational activities conducted under Title 10 U.S. Code by the Department of Defense. The division between Title 50 and Title 10 authorities serves to

delineate the difference between IPB and OPB in the preparation of the battlespace conceptual framework. Another way of phrasing the difference between Title 50 and Title 10 authorities is to characterize Title 50 operations as those conducted by interagency “spies,” while military “scouts” conduct Title 10 operations. Figure 1 below depicts this construct.<sup>33</sup>

The second major division is across the spectrum of conflict that ranges from peacetime to conflict. As a crisis emerges and conflict or a contingency operation appears imminent, the President and Secretary of Defense may choose to authorize a specific range of OPB operations, to include pre-crisis activities (PCA) and advance force operations. Therefore, the publication of an order marks the authoritative dividing line between PCA and AFO in direct support of deploying main forces. Figure 1 below depicts this construct as well.




FIGURE 1: FRAMEWORK FOR PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

Each of the PB components and concepts are defined and discussed using this fundamental preparation of the battlespace framework. Collectively, these terms help to describe the preparation of the battlespace operational concept

#### INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

The first line of defense against terrorism is timely and detailed intelligence. The second line of defense is depth in the strategic environment. Strategic depth includes military preparations and limited offensive operations conducted forward in the Combatant Commander's theater with the objective of disrupting our nation's enemies. The overarching

intent to effective intelligence gathering and strategic depth is to provide warning of impending hostile activities against friendly forces and the homeland. Accurate intelligence and depth enable effective and timely precautionary or preventive measures (to include pre-emptive military operations) to occur before the threat reaches the U.S. mainland.

Threats to U.S. interests can be effectively countered with sufficient preparation and warning time. Conversely, a lapse in intelligence or the lack of actionable intelligence makes it nearly impossible for the U.S. to defend against the full range of terrorist threats. Therefore, intelligence warning and strategic depth enable sufficient reaction time to surge response capabilities and forces to inhibit or prevent the terrorist event.

Strategic IPB is the product of the cumulative efforts of the government's intelligence agencies that focus primarily on the most effective application of U.S. national power to affect the geostrategic environment. Strategic intelligence looks at the economic, military, diplomatic and informational aspects of potential enemies or threats, and seeks to establish the basis for U.S. national actions to mitigate the threat and maintain a stable security environment. At the highest strategic level, it is a global battlespace that requires interagency capabilities and resources to assess the full range of potential threats such as military forces, economic and industrial competitors, non-state and illegal actors, political threats and their context, and sources of hostile information or propaganda. The intent of the strategic intelligence process is to identify risks to our national security and assist national decision makers with the formulation and execution of the national security strategy. Supporting strategic guidance and plans for countering the threats can be developed using this process.<sup>34</sup>

The strategic IPB process is essential to both PB and the global war against terrorism. As previously discussed, many modern terrorist threats have no home address, are global in nature, and cross Combatant Commander boundaries. Consequently, interagency intelligence collection, analysis and production provide the only effective multidisciplinary assessment of threat capabilities and vulnerabilities. U.S. government agencies and departments have collective and multidisciplinary access to foreign law enforcement agencies. The diplomatic, economic, diverse and independent intelligence organizations provide the full gamut of relevant information for developing the campaign against terror. Ideally, the fusion of interagency and international intelligence at the strategic level can provide the early warning necessary to preclude an attack and actionable intelligence for a pre-emptive attack.

Realistically, it is more likely that such fusion will provide only ambiguous indicators of an impending terrorist attack. Reducing ambiguity through proactive measures will become the challenge that falls upon the interagency. Initiating actions to further prepare the battlespace

while developing the strategic intelligence to reduce ambiguity is sine qua non for counterterrorism. This is the essence of PB and involves covert special activities, focusing or re-orienting technical capabilities, and the conduct of information operations (IO).

Covert preparation of the battlespace activities such as special activities normally require a Presidential finding to execute, and fall under the auspices of intelligence authorities as prescribed in Title 50, U.S. Code. Non-military special activities are appropriate when the expected intelligence payoff outweighs the physical and political risk associated with collection. Specially organized, trained and equipped agencies are responsible for conducting covert operations and normally possess the capabilities or operational reach beyond those of military forces. Under certain circumstances, military personnel and equipment may conduct or support Title 50 operations. Military support to Title 50 intelligence operations may be appropriate in cases where the required expertise, equipment, or capability resides within DOD. Military support to non-Department of Defense agencies requires Secretary of Defense approval and compliance with the provisions of The Economy Act.<sup>35</sup>

Below the strategic level, operational IPB is focused on regional problems and significantly narrower in scope than strategic level IPB. While the Combatant Commanders within the geographic regions depend heavily on the strategic IPB process and products, operational-level IPB is essential to refining the intelligence sufficiently for theater-level planning and operations. The overarching focus of operational level IPB is to understand the regional conditions that affect U.S. national security interests, and how a potential regional adversary may operate during a conflict or contingency.

Given that the NSS '02 states that the war on terror is a global campaign, it falls primarily upon Combatant Commanders to develop courses of action to interdict terrorist operations before they can attack U.S. interests. Combatant Commanders are responsible for executing joint operations to further or defend U.S. security interests within their regions. They therefore must have an accurate understanding of the regional conditions that influence their missions. Intelligence and information gaps revealed during the IPB and planning processes are potential risks to the joint force during contingency and wartime operations, and must be addressed prior to the onset of a crisis whenever possible. Theater intelligence gaps are filled either by tasking in-theater assets to collect against the requirement, or by requesting support from strategic level assets. This is where OPB is most applicable—it gives the Combatant Commander the ways and means to fill in the identified gaps via in-theater forces and CONUS-based assets.




FIGURE 2: IPB ACTIVITIES IN PB

#### OPERATIONAL PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE

OPB is in fact well-known to the entire military community where it is used to enhance the probability of success and reduce the risks to committed forces. The OPB activities are conducted in peacetime and prior to a crisis to shape the potential operational environment, prepare for and provide direct support to crisis response and contingency operations. Within the Combatant Commander's theater, OPB focuses on assessing and shaping the operational environment, as well as developing a broad range of enablers to support potential U.S. operations. OPB consists of the full range of activities and operations in a potential operational area, and are divided by specific authorities into pre-crisis activities (PCA) and NCA-approved advance force operations (AFO).<sup>36</sup> PCA include activities such as theater engagement and joint and combined training exercises, pre-crisis surveys and assessments, and unit-specific mission enhancement operations. AFO consists of Secretary of Defense-approved military operations such as clandestine operations, source operations, and deployment of enabling forces and capabilities to conduct target-specific preparations prior to the conduct of an actual operation.<sup>37</sup>

#### Pre-Crisis Activities (PCA)

As discussed above, PCA consists of a broad range of peacetime training events and operational preparation activities. Combatant Commanders conduct innumerable combined training events each year under the umbrella of Theater Security Cooperation programs. U.S. unilateral activities such as surveys and assessments, cover deployments and area orientation



visits also fall under PCA. Each training event is an opportunity to shape the operational environment and gain information that will potentially support future contingency operations. However, without a coherent theater campaign plan that delineates the general pre-conditions required for successful operations, the event may be more of an opportunity lost than value-added to the theater campaign against terrorism.

Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) strategies support the National Security Strategy's first major military tenet of strengthening alliances to defend against terrorism. TSC events aim to shape the regional security environment and support U.S. national objectives. TSC events provide overt access through various engagement programs with regional partners. The Defense Department recently coordinated its Security Cooperation Guidance, and the Secretary of Defense is expected to sign it into effect by mid-2003. This guidance directs the forces involved in security cooperation events to focus training opportunities on developing or enhancing capabilities that support the war on terrorism.<sup>38</sup> Further, it states that each theater is required to develop a tailored TSC strategy to meet specific political and military objectives and incorporate a broad range of military activities, and the primary purpose is to "...provide U.S. forces with peacetime contingency access."<sup>39</sup> Specific TSC objectives include "...open communications; increase interoperability; foster regional military professionalism; and demonstrate by example the role of the military in a democracy."<sup>40</sup>

Multi- and bi-lateral training events that require the deployment of U.S. forces are the prime opportunity for conducting OPB in support of the theater campaign plan against terrorism. These exercises are the best opportunity to assess indigenous force projection infrastructure within the host nation, observe the difference between the expected and the actual capabilities of foreign militaries at multiple echelons, and determine where vulnerabilities may exist. Often, unit after action reviews do not capture this data or subjective assessments, nor are they adequately reported during the intelligence debriefings following the exercise.

Combined exercises and engagement activities are an excellent forum to fill in the information gaps that exist between a force description found in a Jane's Defense publication and potential coalition partner capabilities. This knowledge is essential for knowing how a foreign country can support U.S. military operations against terrorism. TSC events shape the operational environment by strengthening alliance capabilities to support contingency operations and providing a forum to prepare the battlespace. Combined training events develop the environment consistent with our operational concepts, and are a first-hand opportunity to understand the physical and non-physical aspects of the battlespace. Therefore, TSC strategies have to be viewed as a subset of the theater campaign plans against terrorism.

Special Operations Forces routinely conduct small unit joint and combined exchange training (JCET) events in foreign countries as part of the TSC strategy. These events provide multiple venues for preparing the battlespace for future contingency operations. Training events that focus on counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, counterproliferation, and internal defense missions are particularly useful in shaping the security environment and building the essential rapport and cooperation that is necessary during contingency operations. SOF does a relatively good job in capturing information gathered during these events via the Special Operations Data Retrieval System that compiles and manages the reports. Further, JCETs provide the Combatant Commander with a cadre of military personnel that are intimately familiar with the operating environment.

Another effective OPB tool is the use of surveys and assessments in foreign countries. Several U.S. Government and Department of Defense entities also conduct a broad range of surveys across the globe for agency-specific purposes. A recent scan of government web sites on the Internet revealed over fifty different formal survey programs that collect security-related information. The most prolific overseas surveying agencies are the Departments of Defense and State, and the Department of Justice to a lesser extent. Domestically, the Departments of Justice, Energy and Transportation are the primary agencies that conduct security-related site surveys.<sup>41</sup>

The Department of Defense actively conducts security assessments and surveys worldwide. One of the largest and most active survey programs within the DOD is U.S. Special Operations Command's Integrated Survey Program (ISP), which surveys key U.S. Government facilities overseas for contingency purposes. The ISP consists of the Regional Survey Program (RSP) and the Maritime Operational Survey Program (MOSP). The RSP surveys collect and produce information on American embassies and related government infrastructure, data to support contingency planning and operations, plus supporting NEO data. The MOSP surveys ships and selected ports and harbors (if not included in the RSP portion of the survey). All classified survey information at the secret level and below is on the Secure Internet Protocol Router (SIPR) network IntelLink web site.

Other DOD agencies are very active with surveys as well. A specially formed assessment team chartered by the Joint Staff to assess the installation's security vulnerabilities periodically visits U.S. military installations worldwide. U.S. Transportation Command conducts port, harbor and airfield surveys that emphasize the transportation infrastructure aspects of the facilities, and is separate from the ISP data. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) conducts

classified security surveys at overseas weapons storage sites. The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) also surveys specific sites for physical security purposes.

Recently, USTRANSCOM agreed to use the USSOCOM standards for survey information collection and production, and share the data in IntelLink. DTRA has used the USSOCOM standards for several years, and the programs are interoperable and reinforcing to some extent. Similarly, the DIA has explored using the USSOCOM survey standards, but has not decided to transition to those standards for collection and production. Collectively, it appears that the Department of Defense has recognized that the survey programs best serve our national security interests when they use a common set of standards and are readily accessible department-wide via existing information technology.<sup>42</sup>

Common standards and readily accessible products do not appear to be a common practice outside the DOD. Generally, domestic security surveys focus on site and facility security, vulnerability assessments and contingency planning. These surveys are mainly conducted by the Departments of Energy, Transportation (along with the U.S. Coast Guard), and Justice. The DOE has surveyed each of its seventy-six power plants, and recently realized that there is no common standard for survey data collection, nor is there a common format or department-wide procedures for the security surveys. The DOJ surveys mainly focus on the security at VIP venues when the events are designated “National Security Special Events” such as the 2002 Winter Olympics, the Goodwill and Pan American Games, and the 2002 Inauguration. Within the DOJ, both the FBI and the Secret Service conduct security-related surveys, but suffers from the same lack of common standards for collection and production. The DOT, along with the Coast Guard, has surveyed U.S. ports and harbors, as well as some cruise ships. The USCG has recently adopted the USSOCOM ISP standards for collection and production of surveys.<sup>43</sup> However, the various survey regimes are not oriented on an overall homeland defense strategy, or theater requirements to prepare the battlespace for future operations, and only marginally contribute to both the strategic IPB and PB efforts.

This situation can be partially attributed to the lack of an as-yet implemented military campaign plan against terrorism that integrates the various elements of PB into a cohesive effort. A few examples can illustrate this point. Much of the same information in the USTRANSCOM surveys is also in the USSOCOM ISP surveys. Service components routinely direct subordinate components to conduct NEO surveys that inevitably do not correspond with the baseline embassy and ISP data. Finally, there is no single format or established standard for survey and data collection, nor is there one retrievable (“reachback”) repository for the data. While surveys provide an excellent opportunity to collect information to support the IPB process

and OPB, the lack of integration among survey and assessment programs reduces their potential contributions to fighting terrorism.

Frequently, the most difficult and direly needed intelligence in a crisis requires the reporting that only human eyes can provide. Human intelligence—HUMINT—activities require long lead times to recruit, train, and prepare operatives for operational employment. A well-placed HUMINT operative, such as a U.S. armed forces member or a recruited proxy “source,” can be invaluable in providing the intelligence necessary for the conduct of counterterrorist and contingency operations. It is important to note that military forces operating under Title 10 (Military Activities) authorities can and do employ cover, as do agencies operating under Title 50 authorities (Intelligence Activities).

Source operations support and are essential to both IPB and OPB activities and operations.<sup>44</sup> Trained personnel from both DOD and non-DOD agencies routinely recruit foreign sources to provide support and information to U.S. authorities. When authorized, an overt activity such as a combined exercise or peacekeeping mission can embed source recruiting, or specially trained personnel can clandestinely recruit them. These sources are used primarily to support military operations during peacetime, contingencies and crisis. Recruited sources generally provide logistical, operational, or information support to U.S. forces where our sources do not have access. Logistical support can include anything from transportation to water. Operational support can involve a myriad of activities such as helping U.S. evaders in enemy-held areas or providing guides for ground forces. Information support can provide tactical information concerning terrorist target information or activities.

However, source operations have inherent problems, limitations, and risks. The immediate problem is to understand the source's reliability and motivation. Frequently, sources promise to provide more support than they can actually deliver, and may have dubious reasons for supporting U.S. operations. Operational and tactical commanders are routinely skeptical of the veracity of single-source reporting, and this hesitancy is magnified when the single source is a recruited foreigner. Use of foreign information and intelligence sources usually necessitates a very clear understanding of the source's cultural norms and level of sophistication, and how these attributes affect the source's behavior. Concepts of time and distance vary across cultures as do the levels of education, which directly affect the fidelity and timeliness of the information. The source's willingness to risk his personal safety, as well as the supported U.S. force's willingness to allow foreign sources to know essential elements of friendly information, must be carefully assessed to determine the best use or non-use of foreign sources to support contingency operations. Therefore, recruited sources are best used as triggers for other and

more reliable intelligence platforms or HUMINT activities to focus on a specific target area or entity, or for low-risk activities in support of U.S. forces. Despite these concerns, source recruitment and operations are a key component of both IPB and OPB.




FIGURE 3: OPB AND PCA IN PB

### Advance Force Operations (AFO)

Advance Force Operations (AFO) are the next major element of OPB. AFO require the Secretary of Defense's approval—a process that involves a careful assessment of its suitability, acceptability, and feasibility, policy and legal reviews, and a comprehensive risk assessment. AFO involves reconnaissance and surveillance activities, low visibility preparations for receiving the main body deployment, and direct action operations to support committed forces. Prior to D-Day, AFO combat operations can consist of offensive information operations, small-scale direct action missions, JRSOI, and terminal guidance operations. Strategic leaders must carefully consider AFO approval since they have significant implications at the tactical through strategic levels of warfare.

The primary purpose of AFO is often reconnaissance and surveillance (R&S) within the operational and objective areas. The objective of AFO R&S is to provide tactical information and develop the intelligence picture, enabling the senior leadership to decide whether to commit main body forces as a prelude to actual mission execution. Reconnaissance is conducted to provide input to or assess courses of action, and to confirm the actual battlespace conditions

within the operational area and near the military objectives. Surveillance is conducted to maintain contact with a potential target site and provide near-real time reporting on activities in the objective area or named areas of interest.

Joint reception, staging, onward movement and integration (JRSOI) of deploying contingency forces can be provided by AFO elements already positioned in the operational area, and can speed movement of tactical forces to the objective area. Joint Pub 4-01.8, Joint TTP for JRSOI, covers the JRSOI process in detail and emphasizes the point that “JRSOI is the essential process that transitions deploying forces...into forces capable of meeting the combatant commander’s operational requirements.”<sup>45</sup> Both clandestine and overt forces deployed to the area are ideally suited to prepare for the arrival and employment of the main body forces, and can be tasked to acquire or provide reception and staging areas, transportation support, host nation support where appropriate, and logistical support. AFO elements are value-added since they provide updated and relevant intelligence and information, ground guides, and connectivity with reconnaissance and surveillance elements at the objective area. The AFO elements significantly speed up the deployment and subsequent employment of arriving forces, and assist with operational security by keeping their preparation activities low key and out of the general view of the local populace.

AFO forces can also conduct small-scale offensive operations, when authorized, to include terminal guidance operations and direct action in support of the contingency forces. Terminal guidance can include ground-to-air communications for airborne strike forces, laser designation of targets, or ground support for airland or air assaults. Limited direct action missions can support main body forces by interdicting critical communication and transportation nodes, conducting diversionary attacks, or conducting deception operations. In these cases, careful assessment of the size, locations, and capabilities of the in-place AFO force is necessary before ordering direct action missions to ensure the AFO force is capable of executing the mission. Additionally, tactical AFO missions can have strategic consequences given that the AFO forces may be operating clandestinely or in support of some other purpose in the operational area. In this case, careful consideration of the factors of suitability, acceptability, and feasibility is required to ensure the expected benefits to mission success outweigh the political consequences from the direct action operation.

The graphic below depicts the entire spectrum in which major PB activities are conducted, and represents the potential array of environments in which they occur. Currently, the nation is prosecuting a global war against terrorism. Consequently, the nation should be operating in the upper and lower right quadrants of figure 3 and needs to prosecute the war accordingly. In

contrast, the upper and lower left quadrants are primarily oriented on peacetime conditions and the geostrategic environment as we knew it prior to 11 September 2001.




FIGURE 4: OPB AND AFO IN PB

An order from the Secretary of Defense authorizing or directing pre-crisis activities establishes the authoritative distinction between a peacetime environment and preparing for contingency operations or prosecuting the war on terrorism. OPB pre-crisis activities (PCA) support the general preparation of an area or region for future operations. Secretary of Defense authorization is required to move OPB activities from peacetime and pre-crisis categories to operational preparation and the conduct of counterterrorist or other contingency operations. An execution order, for instance, would authorize forces to conduct AFO to focus on a specific target prior to an impending operation. Further, the PCA will continue to prepare the battlespace concurrent with—yet is separate from—target-specific AFO that prepares the immediate operational area for offensive operations.

The National Security, National Military, and Combating Terrorism Strategies provide the necessary framework for the strategic campaign.<sup>46</sup> The DOD and Joint Staff need to approve the coordinated military campaign plan to implement the military aspects of the national strategy. This is the necessary precursor to issuing a standing execute order to focus PB activities to defeat terrorism, authorize AFO, and employ contingency forces quickly for counterterrorist operations. The campaign plan is necessary to accelerate the approval process

and facilitate rapid execution of the operation. Critical aspects of that campaign plan are: standing authorities for overt and clandestine, and operations to include baseline rules of engagement; triggers for deploying forces between theaters or from their CONUS bases; and streamlined approval procedures for conducting offensive operations.

## **WHAT NEEDS TO CHANGE?**

Several changes are essential to successfully prosecute the war on terrorism and effective preparation of the battlespace. The following recommendations fall into three categories: Develop a Strategic Campaign Plan; Exploit Preparation of the Battlespace; and Develop and Streamline Associated Processes.

### **DEVELOP A STRATEGIC CAMPAIGN TO DEFEAT TERRORISM**

The President's National Strategy for Combating Terrorism provides sufficient guidance and an excellent framework for a national campaign plan. Regardless, the global war on terrorism requires a nested family of plans to employ all the elements of national power. The family of plans will provide an overarching framework for conducting the full range of PB activities.

*Interagency Campaign Planning.* The first critical planning occurs at the interagency level. The National Security Strategy is the baseline document that prescribes the "ends" for the war on terrorism, and the Combating Terrorism Strategy provides the outline of the "ways." Each Department or Agency has a unique and important role to play, and constitute the "means" in this complex effort. Likewise, each department has a prescribed set of authorities that need synchronization into a national campaign. The essential requirement is to focus all the national elements of power—diplomatic, information, military and economic—into a cohesive effort that protects our national security using the Departmental ways and means. Arguably, national law enforcement and homeland security campaign plans are required as well.

*Interagency Integration.* The term "integration" implies a significantly greater degree of cooperation than "coordination." Truly interdepartmental staffs are required to synchronize efforts and support operational planning on a global scale. The first requirement is to establish a standing Policy Coordination Committee (PCC) at the national level to coordinate approval for interagency contributions to deliberate and crisis response plans. This group should be a standing entity and specifically chartered to synchronize and integrate each Department's ways and means to support the national counterterrorist strategy and national campaign planning. Currently, National Security Presidential Directive 1 disperses policy coordination for activities



required to fight terrorism among five of the eleven functional PCCs.<sup>47</sup> As an example, the counterterrorism and national preparedness and homeland defense PCCs, are separated from the intelligence and counterintelligence PCC. Further, the regional Joint Interagency Coordination Groups at the theater Combatant Commander's headquarters should be empowered to do more than coordinate and deconflict Departmental activities. The optimal activity for the regional groups would be regional collaborative planning and implementation of Departmental activities to fight terrorism.<sup>48</sup>

Additionally, the DOD has provided liaison elements to other Departments such as State, Justice, Treasury, plus the CIA.<sup>49</sup> While this is a step in the right direction, it remains to be seen whether the liaison arrangement (which appears to be temporary rather than long term) will suffice to accomplish the policy synchronization and collaborative planning tasks.<sup>50</sup>

*DOD Military Campaign Plan.* Approve the coordinated national military campaign plan to fight terrorism. This would serve as the essential basis for developing theater campaign plans plus TSC and PB strategies. It should include standing authorities for AFO activities in support of the national and theater campaign plans.

*Supporting Theater Campaign Plans.* Complementary and reinforcing theater campaign plans are required to successfully prosecute the global war on terrorism in regional increments. Further, theater Combatant Commanders have the responsibilities and, in some instances, the forces to prosecute the war on terrorism in accordance with the coordinated (but not approved) national military campaign plan. One potential problem area in the theater campaign plans is the probability that successful prosecution of transnational terrorists and their networks will cross regional boundaries. A potential solution, discussed in doctrinal publications such as Joint Pub 0-2 (UNAAF), is to establish a standing joint task force to conduct operations that will operate across theater boundaries.<sup>51</sup> Supporting theater campaign plans must incorporate both preparation of the battlespace and theater security cooperation programs to effectively fight terrorism. Further, the DOD Security Cooperation Guidance needs to be approved so that theaters can develop their revised TSC strategies to support the war on terrorism. Revised TSC strategies must also directly support theater campaign planning.

## EXPLOIT PREPARATION OF THE BATTLESPACE NOW

*Use PB.* The first requirement is to understand the operational concept for preparation of the battlespace and how it integrates discrete activities across the operational spectrum. PB is used to shape the operational environment, provide the requisite enablers for contingency operations, and support the rapid deployment of response forces to destroy emerging terrorist

targets. The strategic and theater counterterrorist campaign plans should identify potential operational areas. PB operations can then support contingency planning and preparations, identify supporting infrastructure and capabilities, and establish the necessary relationships to ensure access during the conduct of operations. Most importantly, PB activities build the body of relevant information and intelligence while simultaneously shaping the operational environment to facilitate contingency operations.

*OPB Supports the Fight.* Pre-crisis activities and advance force operations are essential elements of PB and support the overall theater strategy for counterterrorism. Peacetime training events falling under the security cooperation umbrella must "...build defense relationships and allied capabilities to support [U.S. strategic defense] goals and to enable a sustained, multilateral campaign against terrorism."<sup>52</sup> Therefore, OPB operations should be a long-term, integrated and synchronized effort conducted during peacetime and prior to a crisis to prepare for the introduction of crisis response forces. Standing AFO authority will significantly improve the response capabilities of contingency forces, and enable the rapid destruction of emerging or fleeting terrorist targets. PCA and AFO serve as the "ways" to enable counterterrorist and contingency operations, and must be the core aspects of theater campaign plans. Surveys and assessments must be synchronized, focused and oriented on the potential support required for deploying and committed forces. They should use common procedures to collect data, prepare them in standard formats, and distribute to the entire response force.

## DEVELOP AND STREAMLINE ASSOCIATED PROCESSES

*Streamline the Contingency Planning and Approval Process.* First, the current Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) is ponderous and does not adequately support rapid deployment and interdiction of fleeting terrorist targets. The existing Crisis Action Planning system is adequate for time-sensitive planning where pre-approved orders do not meet the emerging operational requirements. However, the approval process needs to be accelerated to successfully and rapidly conduct contingency operations. The Secretary of Defense can speed the approval process by authorizing joint task force commanders or Combatant Commanders to approve a range of PB activities and limited direct action operations when the normal DOD approval process would preclude interdiction of a high payoff target.

Second, incorporate interagency resources into military plans. Energize and use theater interagency coordination groups to synchronize interagency support to military operations and continuously employ collaborative planning. The most urgent need for improvement is streamlining and accelerating the interagency coordination process. Planners must include

interagency actions as part of the standing orders, and synchronize the range of possible responses in a manner similar to the current Annex V of deliberate military plans.

*Improve Intelligence Support.* The fundamental requirement for successful counterterrorist operations is timely and accurate intelligence. Under the IPB category of PB, an interdisciplinary and robust C4ISR capability is required to focus on potential operational areas. The DOD and joint forces must have timely and accurate intelligence that will serve as the triggers for collaborative planning and rapidly conducting decisive operations. Human intelligence operations are a major area for improvement. Recruit, train and use HUMINT assets to trigger the employment of technical intelligence capabilities that have long station times over critical areas. Conversely, use technical intelligence assets to trigger the employment of HUMINT in economy of force areas. Intelligence will have to be of sufficient detail and reliability to be predictive in terms of time, place, and activity or behavior to be useful in the pursuit of terrorists. Standardized survey, assessment and intelligence products are required to form a common operating picture to effectively fight global terrorism.

*Revise Title 10 (Military Activities) and 50 (Intelligence Activities) Authorities.* Currently, the Department of Defense is not authorized to conduct covert activities in support of its operations under Title 10, U.S. Code. Authority for the conduct of covert operations resides in the national intelligence agencies, as specified in Title 50, U.S. Code. Authorize DOD to conduct covert operations and intelligence collection in support of its military counterterrorist requirements and missions. This may require a revision of the U.S. Code to implement, and is the subject of serious debate within the Department of Defense.<sup>53</sup> Quite simply, the forces responsible for prosecuting the military aspects of the war on terrorism should have all the operational and tactical advantages possible to accomplish this national security mission.

## **CONCLUSION**

The global and asymmetric nature of the war on terrorism provides complex challenges for our national security. Preparation of the battlespace is a longstanding concept improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the war on terrorism. American actions prior to 11 September 2001 to prevent terrorism from seriously damaging our national security and interests failed to account for the changing nature of the threat. PB represents an essential method to shape the global and theater security environments to support contingency operations. Use of PB, coupled with modest improvements in related areas can increase the success of our national campaign to confront and defeat terrorism in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

WORD COUNT: 9,247

## ENDNOTES

<sup>1</sup> George W. Bush, "Remarks at the 2002 Graduation Exercise of the United States Military Academy," speech, West Point, NY, 01 June 2002; available from <<http://whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/print/20020601-3.html>>; Internet; accessed 04 September 2002.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid.

<sup>3</sup> George W. Bush, "National Security Strategy 2002," (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), i.

<sup>4</sup> Unsigned, "National Military Strategy—Draft," (Washington, DC: n.p., n.d.), iii.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Mr. Mark Dunham, Staff Officer, The Joint Staff J-3/Special Operations Directorate, Interview by author, 23 December 2002, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

<sup>7</sup> George W. Bush, "National Strategy for Combating Terrorism," (Washington, D.C.: The White House, February 2003).

<sup>8</sup> Eric Schmitt, "Pentagon Draws Up a 10-to-30 Year Anti Terror Plan," New York Times, 17 January 2003; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2003/e20030117147100.html>>; Internet; accessed on 17 January 2003. Schmitt accurately describes the national military campaign plan, and states that it was "...sent to the armed services and the Pentagon's worldwide commands...", and "...the document was coordinated with the National Security Council...". Both USSOCOM and the Joint Staff stated to the author that the campaign plan has not been approved for execution. Also see: Rowan Scarborough, "Rumsfeld Toughens Terror Fight," Washington Times, 02 August, 2002, p. 1; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2002/e20020802toughens.htm>>; Internet; accessed on 02 August 2002; and Susan Schmitt and Thomas Ricks. "Pentagon Plans Shift In War On Terror," Washington Post, 18 September 2002, p. 1; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Sep2002/e20020918pentagon.htm>>; Internet; accessed on 18 October 2002.

<sup>9</sup> Boaz Ganor, "Countering State-Sponsored Terrorism," 25 April 1998, p. 1; available from <<http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=5>>; Internet; accessed on 1 November 2002. This document analyzes and discusses state sponsored terrorism in detail.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>11</sup> Ely Karmon, "The Role of Intelligence in Counter-Terrorism," 26 February 2001, p. 2; available from <<http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=152>>; Internet; accessed on 1 November 2002. Dr Karmon provides an extensive discussion on the changing nature of terrorist entities and the causes for those changes.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid, 2-3.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid, 2-4.

<sup>14</sup> Ibid, 6.

<sup>15</sup> Stan Bedlington, as quoted in "Murky Tactics Surface In the War On Terror," The London Financial Times, 21 November 2002, p. 9; available from <ebird.dtic.mil/Nov2002/s20021122131514.html>; Internet; accessed 26 November 2002. Bedlington described the situation as a legalistic construct that was primarily a law enforcement challenge. However, the U.S. and the rest of the world were slow to realize that "Legality and terrorism are almost antithetical concepts. They do not necessarily coincide."

<sup>16</sup> James Kitfield, "Breaking Al Queda Means Getting Bin Laden," National Journal, 23 November 2002, p. 3497; available from <ebird.dtic.mil/Nov2002/s20021126138495.html>; Internet; accessed 26 November 2002.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid, 3497.

<sup>18</sup> Karmon, 4.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid, 8.

<sup>20</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>21</sup> Eric Herren, "Counter-Terrorism Dilemmas," 15 April 2002, p. 1; available from <<http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=432>>; Internet; accessed on 01 November 2002.

<sup>22</sup> This is my personal evaluation of the situation based on my reading of reports and accounts of the various attacks against U.S interests overseas, and personal discussions with persons professionally involved in counterterrorism.

<sup>23</sup> Kitfield, 3497.

<sup>24</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, as quoted by Alexander Nicoll. "Information Warriors," London Financial Times, 29 December 2001, p. 12; available from <<http://www.nexis.com/research/search/documentDisplay?docnum=15&ansset=A-WW->>; Internet; accessed on 7 December 2002.

<sup>25</sup> Nicoll, p. 12.

<sup>26</sup> The Joint Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 09 January 2003).

<sup>27</sup> David Eichenberger, "Preparation of the Battlespace," briefing slides MacDill AFB, U.S. Special Operations Command, 23 September 2002, slide 3. The full definition of PB according to USSOCOM is: "Umbrella term for all activities conducted prior to D-Day, H-Hour to plan and prepare for potential follow-on military operations. PB consists of intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and operational preparation of the battlespace (OPB). IPB includes collection, analysis, and special activities. OPB includes pre-crisis activities (PCA) and advance force operations (OPB). The only public source of information found on PB to date is: "Special

Operations Forces Take Care Of War On Terror," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, 01 January 2002, 42; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2003/s20030110145323.htm>>; Internet; accessed 10 January 2003. A similar but less accurate document can be found at: Thomas Shanker and James Risen, "Rumsfeld Weighs Covert Action by Military Units," *New York Times*, 12 August 2002, p. 1; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2002/e20020812units.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 August 2002.

<sup>28</sup> U.S. Joint Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace, Joint Pub 2-01.3 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 24 May 2000), I-6 to I-9. The JPub discusses the application and cycles of JIPB at the various levels of command, and the IPB process across the spectrum of military operations in various chapters.

<sup>29</sup> Eichenberger, slide 5.

<sup>30</sup> The term "Pre-Crisis Activities" (PCA) is not currently defined as part of the PB concept. It is explained in this paper to support the discussion of the PB concept.

<sup>31</sup> Eichenberger, slide 6.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. USSOCOM did not include the term "joint" as part of RSOI in its description of AFO. The author included it since joint operations are consistent with both the AFO concept and joint doctrine.

<sup>33</sup> Lawrence Korb and Jonathan D. Tepperman, "Soldiers Should Not Be Spying," *New York Times*, 21 August 2002; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2002/e20020821soldiers.htm>>; Internet; accessed 21 August 2002. Korb and Tepperman lay out the argument for retaining the split between Title 10 and Title 50 authorities. The Defense Department's argument for conducting covert operations is partially explained in: William M. Arkin, "The Secret War," *Los Angeles Times*, 27 October 2002; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2002/e20021028secret.html>>; Internet; accessed 28 October 2002. The CIA's Title 50 activities are discussed in: Douglas Waller, "The CIA's Secret Army," *Time*, 03 February 2003; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2003/s20030127149262.htm>>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2003.

<sup>34</sup> JPub 2-01.3, I-7 – I-8. The JPub discusses the strategic IPB process in general, and provides an overview of the IPB process from the strategic to tactical levels.

<sup>35</sup> Douglas Waller, "The CIA's Secret Army," *Time*, 03 February 2003; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2003/e20030127149262.htm>>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2003. Waller discussed the impact on and controversy between the Department of Defense and the C.I.A. concerning authority for covert operations. This is the essence of the problem between Title 10 and Title 50 operations. For additional points against CIA-led covert operations, see: David Wise, "Why The Spooks Shouldn't Run Wars," *Time*, 03 February 2003; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Jan2003/s20030127149265.htm>>; Internet; accessed 27 January 2003. Also see: Patrick E. Tyler, "Spy Wars Begin at Home," *New York Times*, 03 November 2002; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Nov2003/e200201104spy.htm>>; Internet; accessed 04 November 2002; Thom Shanker and James Risen, "Rumsfeld Weighs New Covert Acts By Military Units," *New York Times*, 12 August 2002, p. 1; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Aug2002/e20020812units.htm>>; Internet; accessed 12 August 2002. The DOD directed that a

study be conducted to determine what changes were necessary to improve operations in the war on terrorism which included the use of covert methods by DOD. The study, conducted by the Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) and known as the "Welch Commission," is discussed in: Greg Miller, "Wider Pentagon Spy Role Is Urged," Los Angeles Times, 26 October 2002, p. 1; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2002/e20021028urged.htm>>; Internet; accessed 28 October 2002; and Rowan Scarborough "Study Urges Wider Authority For Covert Troops vs. Terror," Washington Times, 12 December 2002, p. 3; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2002/e20021212126088.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2002.

<sup>36</sup> Eichenberger, slide 4.

<sup>37</sup> Dunham.

<sup>38</sup> Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy. "Security Cooperation Guidance—Final Draft," SECRET/NOFORN, 03 October 2002. This document was available at the Special Operations Directorate, J-3, The Joint Staff for review by the author. While the overall classification of this document SECRET, a substantial part of it was UNCLASSIFIED. The final guidance document was sent to the Secretary of Defense for signature 25 November 2002.

<sup>39</sup> Ibid, 5.

<sup>40</sup> Department of the Army, The Army in Theater Operations, Field Manual (FM) 3-93, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of the Army, October 2001), 6-40.

<sup>41</sup> MAJ Tony Sparks, USSOCOM Integrated Survey Program Manager, telephone interview by author, 20 December 2002. MAJ Sparks provided the information concerning the plethora of U.S. Government survey programs.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Ibid.

<sup>44</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Joint Pub 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 09 Jan 2003). "2. In clandestine activities, a person (agent), normally a foreign national, in the employ of an intelligence activity for intelligence purposes. 3. In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes information, either with or without the knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. An uncontrolled source is a voluntary contributor of information and many or may not know that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes." For an explanation of the potential use of source operations, see: Rowan Scarborough, "U.S. Forces Get OK To Use CIA Methods," Washington Times, 01 October 2002; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2003/e20021001methods.htm>>; Internet; accessed 01 October 2002.

<sup>45</sup> Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, Procedures for Joint Reception, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration, Joint Pub 4-01.8 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 24 May 2000), I-1.

<sup>46</sup> Dunham.

<sup>47</sup> George W. Bush, "National Presidential Security Directive 1: Organization of the National Security Council," (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 13 February 2001), p. 4.

<sup>48</sup> Dunham. Mr. Dunham discussed the effort to establish interagency coordination groups at the national and theater levels.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid. For the Department of State official counterterrorist policy, see: Colin Powell, "U.S. Counterterrorism Policy." Washington, D.C.: Counterterrorism Office, U.S. Department of State; available from <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/>; Internet; accessed 1 November 2002. "The U.S. Counterterrorism Policy is: First, make no concessions to terrorists and strike no deals; Second, bring terrorists to justice for their crimes; Third, isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism to force them to change their behavior; and Fourth, bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of those countries that work with the U.S. and require assistance." In regard to the taking of American hostages: "The U.S. Government will make no concessions to individuals or groups holding official or private citizens hostage. The United States will use every appropriate resource to gain the safe return of American citizens who are held hostage. At the same time, it is the U.S. Government policy to deny the hostage takers the benefit of ransom, prisoner releases, policy changes, or other acts of concession." Also, the DOS web site has a page that resembles a counterterrorism strategy for the department. See: Francis X. Taylor, Ambassador for Counterterrorism Coordination, "The Global War On Terrorism: The Way Ahead," Address to the Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington D.C., 23 October 2002. Available from <<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/14570.htm>>; Internet; accessed 01 November 2002.

<sup>50</sup> For a press account of U.S. Northern Command's interagency coordination group, see: Philip Shenon and Eric Schmitt, "Meeting Daily, U.S. Nerve Center Prepares for Terrorists," New York Times, 27 December 2002; available from <<http://cg.dtic.mil/egi-bin/ebird.cg>>; Internet; accessed on 28 December 2002. Also, for an article discussing the Terrorist Threat Integration Center consisting of C.I.A., F.B.I. and other counterterrorist agencies, see: David Johnston, "C.I.A. Director Will Lead Center to Combine Agencies' Information on Terror Danger," New York Times, 29 January 2003, sec. A, p. 19. For a insights to the problems associated with interagency cooperation, see: Barton Gellman, "In U.S., Terrorism's Peril Undiminished," Washington Post, 24 December 2002, p. 1; available from <[http://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird.cgi?doc\\_url=Dec2002/e20021224142535.html](http://ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird.cgi?doc_url=Dec2002/e20021224142535.html)>; Internet; accessed 28 December 2002; "Anti-Terror War's Missteps Detailed By Ex-NSC Staffers: Clinton Aides' Book Cites Turf Wars," Washington Post, 02 October 2002, p. 6; available from< <http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2002/e20021002staffers.htm>>; Internet; accessed 02 October 2002; and Evan Thomas, "Shadow Struggle: Why America's intelligence agencies just can't get along," Newsweek, 14 October 2002; available from <[ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2002/s20021007struggle.htm](http://ebird.dtic.mil/Oct2002/s20021007struggle.htm)>; Internet; accessed 07 October 2002.



<sup>51</sup> See Rowan Scarborough, "Study Urges Wider Authority for Covert Troops vs. Terror," Washington Times, 12 December 2002, p. 3; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2002/e2002/212126088.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2002.

<sup>52</sup> Security Cooperation Guidance (Draft), p. 1.

<sup>53</sup> Multiple open source discussions concerning covert operations within DOD have occurred in the press. See: Rowan Scarborough, "U.S. Forces Get OK To Use CIA Methods," Washington Times, 01 October 2002, p. 1; available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2002/e2002/212126088.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2002; Robert Burns, "Covert Side Of Terror War Has Major Supporter In Rumsfeld," San Diego Union-Tribune, 13 November 2002, available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Nov2002/e2002/21114covert.html>>; Internet; accessed 15 November 2002; James Bamford, "How to (De-)Centralize Intelligence," New York Times, 24 November 2002, available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Nov2002/s2002/2125127988.html>>; Internet; accessed 26 November 2002; and Jason Vest, "Pentagon Hawks Take Wing: A New Pentagon Office Could Politicize Intelligence Gathering," The Nation, 16 December 2002, available from <<http://ebird.dtic.mil/Dec2002/s2002/21114320.html>>; Internet; accessed 12 December 2002.

## GLOSSARY

**advance force operations** — Military operations conducted by forces which precede the main elements into the area of operations to prepare the battlespace for follow-on operations. AFO may consist of, but are not limited to, reconnaissance and surveillance; reception, staging, onward movement, and integration of forces; information operations under Title 10 authorities; terminal guidance; and other limited direct action operations. (USSOCOM)

**battlespace** — The environment, factors and conditions that must be understood to successfully apply combat power, protect the force, or complete the mission. This includes air, land, sea, space, and the included enemy and friendly forces; facilities; weather; terrain; the electromagnetic spectrum; and the information environment within the operational areas and areas of interest. (JPub 1-02)

**clandestine operation** — An operation sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment. A clandestine operation differs from a covert operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of the operation rather than on concealment of the identity of the sponsor. In special operations, an activity may be both covert and clandestine and may focus equally on operational considerations and intelligence-related activities.. (JP 3-05.3)

**combating terrorism** — Actions, including antiterrorism (defensive measures taken to reduce vulnerability to terrorist acts) and counterterrorism (offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism), taken to oppose terrorism throughout the entire threat spectrum. Also called **CBT**. (JPub 1-02)

**counterterrorism** — Offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. Also called **CT**. (JPub 1-02)

**cover** — 1. The action by land, air, or sea forces to protect by offense, defense, or threat of either or both. 2. Those measures necessary to give protection to a person, plan, operation, formation, or installation from the enemy intelligence effort and leakage of information. 3. The act of maintaining a continuous receiver watch with transmitter calibrated and available, but not necessarily available for immediate use. 4. Shelter or protection, either natural or artificial. 5. **(DOD only)** Photographs or other recorded images which show a particular area of ground. 6. **(DOD only)** A code meaning, "Keep fighters between force/base and contact designated at distance stated from force/base" (e.g., "cover bogey twenty-seven to thirty miles"). (JPub 1-02)

**cover (military)** — Actions to conceal actual friendly intentions, capabilities, operations, and other activities by providing a plausible yet erroneous explanation of the observable. (JPub 1-02)

**covert operation** — An operation that is so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. A covert operation differs from a clandestine operation in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation. (JP 3-05.3)

**direct action** — Short-duration strikes and other small-scale offensive actions by special operations forces or special operations-capable units to seize, destroy, capture, recover, or inflict damage on designated personnel or materiel. In the conduct of these operations, special operations forces or special operations-capable units may employ raid, ambush, or direct

assault tactics; emplace mines and other munitions; conduct standoff attacks by fire from air, ground, or maritime platforms; provide terminal guidance for precision-guided munitions; conduct independent sabotage; and conduct anti-ship operations. Also called **DA**. (JP 3-05)

**human intelligence** — A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources. Also called **HUMINT**. (JPub 1-02)

**information operations** — Use of offensive and defensive information means to degrade, destroy, and exploit an adversary's information-based process while protecting one's own. Also called **IO**. (JP 2-01.2)

**intelligence** — 1. The product resulting from the collection, processing, integration, analysis, evaluation, and interpretation of available information concerning foreign countries or areas. 2. Information and knowledge about an adversary obtained through observation, investigation, analysis, or understanding. (JP 2-0)

**intelligence-related activities** — Those activities outside the consolidated defense intelligence program that: respond to operational commanders' tasking for time-sensitive information on foreign entities; respond to national intelligence community tasking of systems whose primary mission is support to operating forces; train personnel for intelligence duties; provide an intelligence reserve; or are devoted to research and development of intelligence or related capabilities. (Specifically excluded are programs that are so closely integrated with a weapon system that their primary function is to provide immediate-use targeting data.) (JPub 1-02)

**intelligence operations** — The variety of intelligence tasks that are carried out by various intelligence organizations and activities. Predominantly, it refers to either intelligence collection or intelligence production activities. When used in the context of intelligence collection activities, intelligence operations refer to collection, processing, exploitation, and reporting of information. When used in the context of intelligence production activities, it refers to collation, integration, interpretation, and analysis, leading to the dissemination of a finished product. (JP 2-0)

**intelligence preparation of the battlespace** — An analytical methodology employed to reduce uncertainties concerning the intelligence, technical intelligence, enemy, environment, and terrain for all types of operations. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace builds an extensive database for each potential area in which a unit may be required to operate. The database is then analyzed in detail to determine the impact of the enemy, environment, and terrain on operations and presents it in graphic form. Intelligence preparation of the battlespace is a continuing process. Also called **IPB**. (JP 2-0)

**operational preparation of the battlespace** — Non-intelligence activities conducted prior to D-Day, H-hour, in likely or potential areas of employment, to train and prepare for follow-on military operations. OPB consists of both pre-crisis activities and, when authorized, advance force operations (AFO). OPB compliments intelligence operations (IPB, specifically) in the overall preparation of the battlespace. (USSOCOM)

**preparation of the battlespace** — Umbrella term for all activities conducted prior to D-Day, H-Hour to plan and prepare for potential follow-on military operations. PB consists of intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) and operational preparation of the battlespace (OPB). IPB includes collection, analysis, and special activities. OPB includes pre-crisis activities and advance force operations (AFO). (USSOCOM)

**reconnaissance** — A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. Also called **RECON**. (JPub 1-02)

**source**—1. A person, thing or activity from which information is obtained. 2. In clandestine activities, a person (agent), normally a foreign national, in the employ of an intelligence activity for intelligence purposes. 3. In interrogation activities, any person who furnishes information, either with or without the knowledge that the information is being used for intelligence purposes. In this context, a controlled source is in the employment or under the control of the intelligence activity and knows that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. An uncontrolled source is a voluntary contributor of information and many or may not know that the information is to be used for intelligence purposes. (JPub 1-02)

**special activities** — Activities conducted in support of national foreign policy objectives that are planned and executed so that the role of the US Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly. They are also functions in support of such activities but are not intended to influence US political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or related support functions. (JP 3-05)

**special forces** — US Army forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct special operations. Special forces have five primary missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, direct action, special reconnaissance, and counterterrorism. Counterterrorism is a special mission for specially organized, trained, and equipped special forces units designated in theater contingency plans. Also called **SF**. (JP 3-05)

**special operations** — Operations conducted by specially organized, trained, and equipped military and paramilitary forces to achieve military, political, economic, or informational objectives by unconventional military means in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas. These operations are conducted across the full range of military operations, independently or in coordination with operations of conventional, non-special operations forces. Political-military considerations frequently shape special operations, requiring clandestine, covert, or low visibility techniques and oversight at the national level. Special operations differ from conventional operations in degree of physical and political risk, operational techniques, mode of employment, independence from friendly support, and dependence on detailed operational intelligence and indigenous assets. Also called **SO**. (JP 3-05)

**special operations forces** — Those Active and Reserve Component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations. Also called **SOF**. (JP 3-05.3)

**special reconnaissance** — Reconnaissance and surveillance actions conducted by special operations forces to obtain or verify, by visual observation or other collection methods, information concerning the capabilities, intentions, and activities of an actual or potential enemy or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area. It includes target acquisition, area assessment, and post-strike reconnaissance. Also called **SR**. (JP 3-05.5)

**surveillance** — The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things, by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means. (JPub 1-02)

**terminal guidance** — 1. The guidance applied to a guided missile between midcourse guidance and arrival in the vicinity of the target. 2. Electronic, mechanical, visual, or other assistance given an aircraft pilot to facilitate arrival at, operation within or over, landing upon, or departure from an air landing or airdrop facility. (JPub 1-02)

**terrorism** — The calculated use of unlawful violence or threat of unlawful violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological. (JP 3-07.2)

**terrorist** — An individual who uses violence, terror, and intimidation to achieve a result. See also **terrorism**. (JP 3-07.2)

**terrorist groups** — Any element, regardless of size or espoused cause, that commits acts of violence or threatens violence in pursuit of its political, religious, or ideological objectives. See also **terrorism**. (JP 3-07.2)

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